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ularly with regard to intangibles like insurance whose presence is fictional,
is simply an outmoded hangover from Pennoyer.
LINDA KELSO

FTC REGULATION OF TV ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN THEY DESERVE A BREAK TODAY
Manipulation of children's minds in the fields of religion or politics
would touch off a parental storm of protest and a rash of Congressional investigations. But in the world of commerce children are fair
game and legitimate prey.'
America has witnessed a growing concern over the effects of television
upon the psychological and physiological maturation processes of young children. Numerous studies have attributed violent personality traits, diet deficiencies, and early cynicism in children to the increasingly pervasive broadcasting medium.2 In particular, parents are deploring the overcommercialization of children's television programming and the effects of seller hucksterism. This public outcry against overcommercialization has largely been
directed toward the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) whose administrative
authority includes the regulation of advertising.3 Exemplifying current public
fervor are two recently filed petitions pending before the Commission. One
particularly effective consumer group, Action for Children's Television
4
(ACT), has petitioned for a ban on candy commercials addressed to children.
Additionally, Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) has requested
a ban on advertisements of highly sugared snack foods directed toward children and a requirement that added sugar in other foods and a health warning be disclosed.5 These petitions, however, are only current examples of
a series of petitions presented to governmental agencies in an attempt to
secure stricter regulation of television advertising to children. 6 Restrictive
1. Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368, 374 (1971) (Johnson, C., concurring).
2. See notes 38-50 infra and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §52(b) (Supp. V 1975).
4. ACT is a Massachusetts-based, nonprofit consumer interest group of approximately
10,000 members. The group's objective is to improve children's television and prevent its
commercialization. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION
ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN, (Feb. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
5. CSPI is a District of Columbia-based nonprofit consumer interest group of approximately 4,000 members. The group's objective is to improve domestic food policies. Id.
6. E.g., Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971); 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 50,229 (denial of ACT's petition requesting a ban on advertising of edibles on
children's television); see also Putting a Lid on Kid Vid, SALES MANAGEMENT, July 1, 1971,
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proposals aimed at children's advertising have previously been contemplated
by the Federal Trade Commission 7 indicating that the government is aware
of the problem and increasing the prospects of meaningful regulation.
Within this setting of high public sentiment and governmental concern,
the FTC has again initiated action to constrict children's advertising. Before
the FTC is the controversial FTC Staff Report on Television Advertising to
Children, recommending that the Commission initiate rulemaking proceedings to determine whether it should:
(a) Ban all televised advertising for any product which is directed to,
or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of children
who are too young to understand the selling purpose of, or otherwise
comprehend or evaluate, the advertising;8
(b) Ban televised advertising directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older children 9 for sugared products, the consumption of which poses the most serious dental health
risks;
(c) Require that televised advertising directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older children for
sugared food products not included in paragraph (b) be balanced by
nutritional and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers. 0
1
Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty FTC Improvements Act,3
the Commission will commence the rulemaking process to determine the
propriety of issuing a Trade Regulation Rule on the basis of the staff's recommendations.12 The legal propriety of the staff's proposed decommercial-

at 40 (noting a branch of the White House Conference on Children called the Section on
Child Development and the Mass Media bas sent a report to the President asking for
changes in the television ad structure).
7. E.g., Advertising of Children's Premiums on Television, 89 Fed. Reg. 25,505 (1974)
(to be codified in 16 C.F.R. Part 257); see also Advertising Age, March 25, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
8. "Young children" refers to children below the age of eight. STAFF REPORT, supra
note 4, at 10 n.16.
9. "Older children" refers to children aged eight to eleven. Id. at 11 n.17. The Supreme
Court has indicated that the age of a minor is important in assessing the requisite capacity
for individual choice. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 897 U.S. 728 (1970) (dictum). When
considering protection of children from offensive language, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals found the word "children" to be unconstitutionally vague and indicated that
what is offensive to a seven-year-old may not be offensive to a 19-year-old. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 8026 (1978).
'10. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-11.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-687, 88 Stat. 2193 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
12. 15 U.S.C. §57a (1976). Under the rulemaking proceedings, the Commission is authorized to prescribe interpretive. rules, general statements of policy, and rules specifically
defining acts or practices concerning unfairness or deception. Id. §75a(a). Under the procedures for rulemaking, the FTC must: (1) publish notice of the proposed rulemaking
along with the reasons therefore; (2) permit interested persons to submit their views; (8)
hold an informal hearing; and (4) promulgate a final rule based on the record, if appropriate. Id. §57a(b). The calendar for the rulemaking in question has been set. A public, legislative hearing will commence Nov. 6, 1978. A hearing on disputed issues will be held April 2,
1079. A staff report making recommendations as to the final rule is to be released by
July 27, 1979. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 331, May 1, 1978 at 10. A trade regulation rule
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ization of children's television largely rests on a determination that the proposed regulation is "in the interest of the public," 13 and comports with
constitutional requirements as well as economic reality. This note discusses
whether restrictions on children's advertising are socially, legally and economically justifiable. Initially, the public interest justification for the proposal
and the statutory grounds upon which the Commission may base its proposed regulation are considered. Following this examination is a delineation
of the potential constitutional and economic problems confronting the
proposal and the possible resolution of these problems.
THE EVIDENTIARY JUSTIFICAUTCION

The first issue to be resolved while surveying the results of research
and experimentation in the children's advertising field is whether the proposed regulation is warranted by the facts. 14 The conclusion lies in the constantly increasing evidence that television advertising addressed to childen
has a deleterious effect on their psychological and physiological well-being.
Commercialized children's programming has increased dramatically from
the time of its inception in 1952.16 United States companies now spend more
than $600 million annually on advertising aimed at children. 6 The typical
child views 23V hours of television per week and is exposed to approximately
21,000 commercials each year.' 7 By the age of 16 he may see more of television than he does of his school teachers.' 8 The sheer magnitude of product
promotion on children's programming indicates that advertisers feel commercials have a significant impact on the child consumer.' 9 Whether that
is, in effect, administrative legislation which binds all members of the industry to which
the rule is applicable. See Hobbs, Legal Issues in FTC Trade Regulation Rules, 32 FOOD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 414 (1977); Kitner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 673-79 (1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1976).
14. The Magnuson-Moss Act requires a statement of basis and purpose to accompany
a rule, thus necessitating the presentation of facts to provide a rational justification for
promulgating the rule. 15 U.S.C. §57a(d) (1976).
15. TV Advertising of Food to Children- Part IV: Hearings Before the Select Comm.
on Nutrition & Human Needs of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 378 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Nutrition] (Miss Frances of the show "Ding Dong School"
presented the first personal commercial during a children's program).
16. Sugar in the Morning . . ., NEWSWEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 75.
17. Federal Trade Commission Amendments of 1977 and Oversight: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fin., 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 346 (1977) (statement of
Robert B. Choate) [hereinafter cited as FTC Amendments Hearingsl. Approximately 90%
of the viewing time by those under 12 is in the late afternoon, with the remaining 10%
on Saturday and Sunday mornings. Id. See also J. HowARD & J. HULBERT, ADVERTISING &
THE PUBLIC INTERESTS: A STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 59 (1973).
18. FTC Amendments Hearings, supra note 17, at 375. For informative statistics on
the characteristics and quality of children's commercials, see Broadcast Industry's Response
to TV Ads- Part 8: Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Nutrition and Human Needs
of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 698-700 (1973) (item I appendix submitted by Stockton Helffrich) [hereinafter cited as Broadcast Response].
19. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 16, at 75; Edible TV: Your Child and Food Commercials:
Prepared by the Council on Children, Media and Merchandising for the Select Comm. on
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impact is beneficial or injurious has become a central issue of debate in

congressional hearings20 as well as in the public sector.
The advertising industry maintains that advertising aimed at children

is a necessary element of consumer socialization.

1

Industry spokesmen insist

such advertising is extremely valuable

in the learning of the proper criteria to use in evaluating products,

the value of money spent for several items versus the purchase of a
larger sum later, the determination of the standards appropriate to 22a
... the development of character
particular age, class and way of life
23

and the creation of self-confidence.

However, such lofty concern for the child's socialization and education has
been diluted somewhat by industry's own admission: "Our primary goal is
24
to sell products to children, not educate them."
The majority of relevant data flowing from recent research and experimentation contradicts industry's position that advertising aids the child's

learning process. A 1975 report based on the FTC's Special Hearings on
Modern Advertising Practices concluded that reformation was critically needed
in the children's advertising area.- Although the report urged that more
research be undertaken before any severe regulatory measures were promulgated,26 it disclosed that children under six: (1) confuse commercials with
the programming, thus evidencing no understanding of the purpose of advertisements; 27 (2) are noticeably more credulous of advertising claims than
older children; and (3) fail adequately to sort the relevant from the irrelNutrition and Human Needs of the United States Senate, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1977)
(statement of Peggy Charren) [hereinafter cited as Edible TV]. For a Federal Communications Commission view on the "child consumer," see Action for Children's Television,

50 F.C.C.2d 1, 39 (1974).
20.
21.
22.

See notes 17-19 supra.
See J. HowARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 165.
Id. See also Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1,

37 (1974).
23. National Nutrition Policy: The Food Industry - Its Resources and Activities in
Food Production and Nutrition: A Working Paper Prepared by Cynthia B. Chapman for
the Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Need§ for the United States Senate, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as National Nutrition].
24. Broadcast Response, supra note 18, at 371. Compare the four-step procedure used
by cereal advertisers to develop children's advertising, J. HOWARD & J. HuiL.BRT, supa note
17, at 58, with the admission of industry that the purpose of food advertising is to prepare
a child to enter the marketplace with a predisposition for a certain advertised product.
Edible TV, supra note 19, at 9. See also Advertising Age, Oct. 10, 1977 at 8, col. 1; Id., Dec.
19, 1977, at 4, col. 4 (where toy manufacturers claimed no obligation to justify their ads
to children but in any event, claimed their ads lower prices and ensure children will receive
desirable toys).
25. J.HowAmw & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 88.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id. at 62-63. See also Bever, Simith, Bergen & Johnson, Young Viewers, Troubling
Response'to TV Ads, 53 HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 119 (Nov.-Dec. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Bever]. One five-year-old believed the purpose of commercials was to provide the actors
with a rest. Id. at 117.
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evant. 25 Similarly, research has disclosed that young children have less capac29
ity to discriminate both perceptually and cognitively than do older children
30
and are less able to perceive similarities between brands. Authorities have
openly criticized television advertising directed toward children, finding that
"an advertisement to a child has the quality of an order, not a suggestion"
as a "child lacks the ability to set priorities, to determine relative importance
31
and to reject some directives as inappropriate." Children also have been
32
depicted as prisoners of visual input. Supporting these assertions are experiments demonstrating that young children fail to question the central
character of a commercial,3 have a higher recall of commercials than program content,2 4 and feel that advertised products are superior to unadver33
tised ones.
Other studies, focusing on advertising's effect on minority children and
on those of low socio-economic background, indicate that these children
possess an "appallingly low degree of consumer awareness of [the] intent
and purpose of television commercials." 6 These children watch more television than their suburban middle-class counterparts, and evidence a strong
28. J. HOWARD & J. HULBrT, sugbra note lrM,at 88. Toy manufacturers have alleged
experimentation results proving that even two and three-year-olds distinguish between the
real world and fantasy. Advertising Age, Dec. 19, 1977, at 4, col. 4. However, according to
Bever, supra note 27, at 112, this ability to distinguish is not mastered until the age of seven.
29. See Bever, supra note 27, at 110, discussing the theory of child behavior of Jean
Piaget, a leading developmental psychologist. According to Piaget, a child confronts two
different models of the world as he matures -a figurative model and an operational model.
The figurative model is based on what a child perceives and the impressions derived therefrom. A child must balance this against his operational model based on impressions gathered
through his operational and logic skills. At first the two models conflict with each other,
but as the child matures, he is able to integrate and correlate his perceptions and his
logical processes. Using this theory of child development, Bever reached thei following
conclusions through his experimentation: (1) five- and six-year-olds: these youngsters
generally enjoy advertising as part of the programming, thus making it an irrelevent factor
to them and not upsetting them should the advertising be misleading; (2) seven- to ten-yearolds: from seven to nine children unsuccessfully attempt to integrate advertising into their
lives and become so highly frustrated that by age ten, they resolve the conflict between their
two models temporarily by deciding that all advertising is misleading; (3) 11- to 12-yearolds: the maturing children are generally able to resolve their inner conflicts and identify
the good and bad aspects of advertising. Id. at 119.
30. J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 64.
31. Hearingson Nutrition, supra note 15, at 411.
32. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 12.
33. Id. See also Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C. 1 (1974)
in which the Federal Communications Commission adopted a policy prohibiting host-selling
on children's programs.
34. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 11. See also Ward, Effects of Television Advertising
on Children and Adolescents, CILDREN AND TELEVISION 304 (R. Brown ed. 1976) (finding
that older children are less inclined to devote attention to commercials than are young
children).
35. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 10. See also Reiss, Special Problems in Advertising,
31 FooD DRUG. CosM. L.J. 252 (1976). For a brief discussion of television's role in the
commercialization and socialization of children, see FTC Amendment Hearings, supra note
17, at 369.
36. FTC Amendment Hearings, supra note 17, at 368.
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belief in the complete truthfulness of commercials. This reliance on the total
veracity of commercials leads to early skepticism and cynicism among all
classes of children when they discover that the advertised product's characteristics are inferior to those characteristics perceived from the advertisement. 3 7
Similarly, advertising directed toward children has been found to have
a deleterious effect on the parent/child relationship.3 8 Children are often

encouraged by commercials to pressure parents into purchasing the advertised product, thus promoting confrontation and alienation between parent
and child.31 Even the FTC has recognized the parent/child interplay in the

purchasing process and has noted the potentially harmful effects advertising
can have on the family relationship.40
This intrusion into familial harmony has also had a substantial impact

37. Id. It was also noted in the congressional hearings that advertising to children
promotes distrust of adults and society. Id. at 369. See also Mass Media: Children and TV
Commercials, INTELLECr, May-June 1976, at 552-53 (giving relevant findings of the American
Psychological Association); J. How"an & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 65; Bever, supra
note 27, at 119. There, it was suggested that "TV advertising is stimulating preadolescent
children to think about socially accepted hypocrisy. They may be too young to cope with
such thoughts wthout permanently distorting their views of morality, society, and business."
Bever also contended that perhaps a child should remain unexposed to 'advertising until
the age of 12, whereupon he could be exposed and still become an alert consumer without
going through four years of moral conflict. Id. at 120.
38. See generally Bever, supra note 27.
39. Hearings on Nutrition, supra note 15, at 374. After viewing commercials, approximately 90% of the children surveyed felt like requesting parents to purchase the product,
60% actually saw themselves making such a request, and 50% perceived parents yielding.
Children and TV Commercials, IWrnraJewr, May-June 1976, at 553. Industry promotes these
results as witnessed in the following sales promotion for station WXNE: "Kid power is
coming to Boston. If you're selling, Charlie's mom is buying. But you've got to sell Charlie
first. His allowance is only 500 a week but his buying power is an American phenomenon.
He's not only tight with his mom, but he has a way with his dad, his grandma and Aunt
Harriet, too. When Charlie sees something he likes, he usually gets it. Just ask General
Mills, McDonald's or Mattel . . . . So whether its toothpaste or toy trucks, burgers or
bionic dolls... Charlie's mom is buying. But you've got to sell Charlie first." Broadcasting
Magazine, August 29, 1977, at backcover.
40. See, e.g., Avalon Industries, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1728, 1750 (1973); Ideal Toy Corp., 64
F.T.C. 297, 310 (1964). Cf. the reverse advertising technique of exploiting the parents'
emotional concern for their children's well-being: Nat'l Talent Assoc.'s, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1202
(1975) (misleading exploitation of parental desire to see child become "famous"); Guild
Industries Corp., 86 F.T.C. 693 (1975) (stressing the "dangerous" characteristics of conventional high chairs to encourage purchases of his own model); ITT Continental Baking
Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973) (exploiting parents' desire to ensure the physical health of their
children by portraying Wonder Bread as a necessity for healthy growth); Standard Brands,
Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1176 (1973) (attempt to frighten parents into purchasing respondent's margarine by portraying a child as likely to incur the same risk of heart and artery disease as
a middle-aged man). See generally Reed, The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and
the Need for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. B.L.J. 171 (1975); Reed & Coalson, EighteenthCentury Legal Doctrine Meets Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: F.T.C. Regulation of Emotionally Conditioning Advertising, 11 GA. L. REV. 733 (1977); Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972 Wis. L. Rsv. 1097 [hereinafter
cited as Psychological Advertising].
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on food consumption by children.41 Studies have shown that food item requests by children increase proportionately with television viewing time 42
and that the vast majority of mothers yield to those requests. 43 Food product
advertising alone accounts for over 50% of the commercials on children's
programs. 44 A survey of Saturday and Sunday morning children's programming during the first nine months of 1975 yielded these results: there were
a total of 5459 commercials for cereal, candy and gum, but only four commercials for meat, vegetables, cheese, milk, butter, eggs and vegetable juices. 45

These figures, when compared with the total advertising for each category appearing on all programming for the nine-month period,4 6 demonstrate that
non-nutritious foods are being promoted to children while the more nutritional foodstuffs are advertised primarily to adults. 47
Besides the obvious detrimental effect of such advertising on the general
health and nutrition awareness of children,48 the encouragement to eat heavily
sugared snack foods, cereals, soft drinks and candy has created a rampant
dental decay problem in the United States. Children and adolescents not
only compose the group most susceptible to dental decay 49 but also have the
highest sugar intake and the poorest quality diets. 50 Industry's response to
accusations of poor dietary advertising has been predictable. The presweetened cereal industry, for example, rationalizes that children receive
more nutrition from a breakfast of pre-sweetened cereal than from an undesirable and therefore uneaten breakfast of wholesome foods. 51 The unten41.

That industry has certainly recognized this impact as evidenced by a publication

by General Mills entitled MEAL

PLANNING

FOR

CHILDREN

in which General Mills states

that the major problem in raising children under 12 is their addiction to snacks between
meals. Pertschuk, Capitalizing on Kid Power, THE NEW LEADER, Jan. 30, 1978, at 16.
42. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 26. This effect is predictable based on Ward's findings
that younger children in particular show a high recall of food advertisements. Ward,
supra note 34, at 304.
43. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 23. In the five-to-seven age group, 88% of mothers
yielded to cereal requests, 52% to snack foods, 40% to candy and 38% to soft drinks
requests. Id. at 23. In the eight-to-ten group, 90% of mothers yielded to cereal requests.
Id. at 24.
44. Id. at 9.
45. FTC Amendment Hearings, supra note 17, at 363.
46. Id.
47. For a further discussion of statistics supporting this assertion, see id. at 864.
48. Edible TV, supra note 19, at 69. See also FTC Amendment Hearings, supra note 17,
at 369 (giving the high percentage of "nutritionally inappropriate" responses by children
when asked dietary questions).
49. TV Advertising of Food to Children -Part 111: Hearings Before the Select Comm.
on Nutrition and Human Needs of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as TV Advertising Hearings]. See also STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at
appendix A (statement of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs).
50. TV Advertising Hearing5, supra note 49. See also Statement of the American Dental
Association on Sugar and Dental Care, id. at 323. For a general discussion of the dental
cavity's effect of snacking see Hearings on Nutrition, supra note 15, at 372. Sugar has also
been linked to coronary heart disease, hypertension, and increased diabetes. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 4, at 150-53.
51. TV Advertising Hearings. supra note 49, at 321; Advertising Age, March 6, 1978, at
I, col. 3. See also Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1977, at E-1, col. 5 (Kellogg citing three much
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ability of industry's position is portrayed in the comparison of two publications by General Mills. One booklet, "Meal Planning for Young Children,"
advises mothers to:
use sparingly foods high in sugar. They take away the appetite for
more basic foods, provide only calories and quick energy and encourage
tooth decay. No coaxing is necessary to get children to eat candy,
for
cookies, cake or drink carbonated beverages. Teaching a perference
52
other types of foods must begin early in the high-chair stage.
Compare this advice with a commercial for one of General Mills' cereals:
Mirror, mirror on the wall, whose cereal is the supersweetest of them
all? Is it my Count Chocula?53 My supersweet cereal, chocolate sweet
is for monster chocolate flavor.
This evidence of industry's failure to regulate itself is further compounded
by the advertisers' use of children in research concerning the effectiveness
of advertising techniques. 54 Such research aims to distinguish different segments of the child market in order to exploit each segment's particular
vulnerability.55 Industry purports that its own self-regulation proceduresand various provisions of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
Code, protect children from exploitation.57 The foregoing discussion, however, indicates that industry has been unable to overcome the inherent
incongruity of minimizing child exploitation while seeking to maximize
profits. Much of the above data has been used to provide the requisite
rational basis and purpose5 s for the current staff proposal to constrict television advertising to children. Assuming that sufficient factual information
supports the proposed regulation, the issue of the FTC's power to apply

criticized clinical studies to substantiate claims that sugar coated cereals are "highly
nutritious" and "not harmful to children, do not contribute to tooth decay, heart disease,
obesity or even significantly to the consumption of sugar").
52. Pertschuk, Capitalizing on Kid Power, Tim NEW LEADER, Jan. 30, 1978, at 15.
53. Hearings on Nutrition, supra note 15, at 389.
54. See, e.g., Advertising Age, Oct. 10, 1977, at 3,col. 1; see also J. HOWARD &J. HULBERT,
supra note 17, at 58.
55. See W. MELODY, CHILDREN'S TELEVIsION: TiE ECONOMICS OF EXPLOITATION (1973)
reprinted in, Hearings on Nutrition, supra note 15, at 43 [hereinafter cited as W. MELODY].
56. J. HoWARD & J. HuLBERT, supra note 17, at 77. For a recent example of selfregulation see Advertising Age, May 15, 1978, at 20, col. I (agreement by cereal advertisers
to modify anti-nutritious advertisements after National Advertising Division, Council of
Better Business Bureau pressure).
.-57. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF, BROADCASTR, THE TELEVISION CODE (18th ed. 1975).
For a general discussion of relevant NAP Code provisions, see Broadcast Response .supra
note 24, at 693-98 (1973). See also statement of NBC vice-president expressing broadcasters'
concern for children. Id. at 673. One problem with the effectiveness of NAB code provisions in regulating children's advertising is that only 60% of the licensed broadcasters
are members. 1976 TRADE Rc.

REP. (CCH) 60,687.

58. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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the proposed regulations based on charges of unfairness and deception remains to be considered. 9
BASIS FOR

FTC

REGULATION

OF ADVERTISING

The Unfairness Charge-Its History and Application
Under the original 1914 FTC Act,60 the Commission was created primarily to promote competition and eradicate monopolistic practices in the
business community. Specifically, the FTC was given authority to prevent
"[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce."' ' Early Supreme Court
decisions narrowly construed this provision of the Act, limiting its application to protect businesses from unfair competition while ignoring the advertisement's effect on individual consumer. 62 The Court, however, later relented somewhat by considering a marketing technique's impact on children
in F.T.C. v. R. F. Keppel 6"Bros., Inc.63 The Court affirmed the FTC's prohibition of a candy marketing technique whereby children were encouraged
to purchase an inferior quality candy, on the chance that they might win
additional prizes, money or candy. 4 In reversing the Commission's decision,
the Third Circuit Court had declared that since other competitors were free
to use the same marketing practice, no unfair method of competition existed.6 5
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, however, finding it
clear that the practice is of the sort which the common law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy .... It would
seem a gross perversion of the normal meaning of the word, which is
the first criterion of statutory construction, to hold that the method
is not "unfair."66
The Court stated that the practice was unfair to competitors because it exerted economic pressure on them to adopt this morally reprehensible conduct. 6 7 This reasoning arguably limited the holding to unfair practices between competing businesses. More important, however, the Court commented
that even if the technique involved were not considered false or deceptive,
it nonetheless "induce[d] children, too young to be capable of exercising an
intelligent judgment of the transaction, to purchase an article less desirable
in point of quality or quantity than that offered at a comparable price in

59.

15 U.S.C. §57a (1976).

60. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§44-58 (1976)).
61. Id. §45(a)(1).
62. "The paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from the evils likely
to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial degree
.... Unfair trade methods are not per se unfair methods of competition." FTC v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48, 649 (1031).
63. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
64. Id. at 307-08.
65. R.F. Keppel & Bros. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1933), rev'd, 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
66. 291 U.S. at 313 (1934).
67. Id. at 312-13.
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the straight goods package." 8 Thus the Court considered not only the advertisement's impact on competitors, but on the consumer as well.
The passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments in 198869 was a clear indication that the Commission's jurisdiction extended to the protection of consumers.70 By adding the words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . .
commerce," 71 and thus confirming the language used in Keppel, the amendments eliminated the need to show unfair practices injurious to competitors.
In 1964, the Commission issued the first significant interpretation of its
ability to regulate practices which were unfair, yet not necessarily deceptive
nor violative of antitrust laws. The Commission listed three indicia of unfairness, now commonly known as the Cigarette Rule:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law, or otherwise- whether, in other words, it is within
at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(8) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors
or other businessmen) .72
The Commission noticeably failed to indicate whether all three factors must
be shown. It merely stated that "[i]f all three factors are present, the challenged conduct will surely violate Section 5."73 Ultimately in F.T.C. v. Sperry
& Hutchinson, Co.74 the Supreme Court confirmed the Commission's juris75
diction over unfair practices, comparing the FTC to a court of equity.
The Court also cited with approval the thtee-factor Cigarette Rule and
78
indicated that all these factors need not be proved.
Shortly after the Sperry decision, the Commission further clarified the
68. Id. at 309.
69. Ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §45 (1976)).
70. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REy. 1005,
1021 (1967). "This amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair
trade practice, of equal concern before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1937).
71. 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1) (1976). The dissemination of any false advertisement is an
unfair or deceptive act or practice within the scope or §45. Id. §52(8).
72. Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising
and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 FE. REr.
8324, 8355 (1964) (statement of Basis and Purpose).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
75. Id. at 244. The FTC has indicated that unfairness is not a static concept. "The
Commission, in short, is expected to proceed not only against practices forbidden by
statute or common law, but also against practices not previously considered unlawful, and
thus to create a new body of law- a law of unfair trade practices adapted to the diverse
and changing needs of a complex and, evolving competitive system." All-State Indus., 75
F.T.C. 465, 491 (1969).
76. 405 U.S. at 244 n.5.
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unfairness issue of Pfizer, Inc. 7 in which two separate violations of Section
5 were alleged: first, unlawful deception and, second, unlawful unfairness.
The unfairness charge rested upon the respondent's purported failure to
substantiate adequately advertising claims concerning a sunburn-relief product
which it manufactured 8 Although the complaint was ultimately dismissed7 9
the Commission emphasized that "if the advertising is aimed at a specially
susceptible group of people (e.g., children), its truthfulness must be measured
by the impact it will make on them, not other[s] to whom it is [not] primarily directed."8 0
In ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc.81 the FTC reiterated that audience
composition is an important factor in determining unfairness but exhibited
a reluctance to press the unfairness issue on the facts presented. ITT involved a series of advertisements for Wonder Bread portraying a child going
through a "fantasy growth sequence"8' 2 while the bread's nutrition values
were extolled. The complaint alleged that these commercials "tend to exploit the aspirations of children for rapid and healthy growth and development,"8 3 and thus were false, misleading, deceptive and unfair. Voluminous
medical testimony evidencing the vulnerability of children and their peculiar
perceptions of advertising was introduced, but the Commission declined to
pursue the unfairness allegation that was based on the portrayal of Wonder
Bread as an extraordinary growth food. It instead held that the unfairness
argument rested almost entirely on the commercial's false promises that also
were the basis of the deceptiveness allegation, thereby negating any necessity
of a separate charge of unfairness.84 Of greater importance was the Commission's acknowledgement that commercials which "address themselves to
particularly vulnerable aspects of their audiences . . . might conceivably
render even truthful messages unfair"'5 and that the same practices could
indeed give rise to the two separate offenses of unfairness and deception.86
Only the Commission chairman, in a strong dissent, declared that the Wonder

77. 81 F.T.C. 19 (1972).
78. Id. at 57.
79. The Commission concluded that the respondent had a reasonable basis for his
claims. Id. at 68.
80. Id. at 65, quoting H.W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963). See also Trade
Regulation Rule, supra note 72, at 8358: "[u]nder Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in particular, it has been recognized that minors constitute an especially
vulnerable and susceptible class requiring special protection from business practices that
would not be unlawful if they only involved adults." Id.
81. 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973), modified and enforced, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976).
82. The "fantasy growth sequence" was the phenomenon in many Wonder Bread
commercials in which a child was pictured as growing to 90% of his adult height in just
a few seconds. Id. at 951-52.
83. Id. at 872.
84. Id. at 963. The Commission felt that all injuries to parents or children flowing
from the advertisements were inseparably connected with the falsity of the claims; therefore, there could not be two separate charges. Id. at 963-64.
85. Id. at 963. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
86. 83 F.T.C. at 964.
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Bread commercials were indeed unfair in their exploitation of a child's
inability to distinguish reality from fantasy. s The decision in ITT illustrates an attempt by the Commission to deal
with unfair children's advertising on a case-by-case basis rather than through
industry-wide regulations. In 1972, however, prior to the final disposition of
ITT, the Commission proposed contemporaneous complaints against three
children's vitamin advertisers, indicating a possible industry-related approach
to unfairness regulation.88 Proponents of regulation feared the vitamin advertisements encouraged dangerous self-medication by children. The three
companies "voluntarily" removed their ads from children's programs s9 and
as a result of this pressured removal, the movement to promulgate concrete
guidelines for advertising vitamins was abandoned. 90
In 1973, Chairman Lewis A. Engman announced the planned development of a voluntary code concerning television advertising for children.
Pursuant to this goal, the Children's Television Advertising Project (CTAP)
was established.9 The project which brought together representatives of
industry, consumer organizations, broadcasters, advertisers, medical profeswas unable to formulate a Code of Practices
sions and governmental agencies
92
acceptable to the entire group.
Dissatisfied with the failure of the CTAP and the advertising industry's
self-regulatory mechanism to police children's commercials, Chairman Engman proposed an industry guide restricting the advertising of child-directed
premiums and similar promotional devices over television. 3 The proposal
was based on the unfairness doctrine94 and noted that even though advertising premiums may not be an unfair practice when directed at adult consumers, "the fact that premiums are now targeted directly at the young gives
the arguments in favor of their restriction a new persuasiveness."9' 5 The proposal also warned that restrictions on premium advertising would not preclude future regulation of children's advertising in other areas.6 Despite this
strong language, the Commission later rejected the proposed guide on premium advertising. Citing limited resources and lack of sufficient informa87. Id. at 942 (Chairman Engman dissenting in part).
88. Thain, Suffer the Hucksters to Come Unto the Little Children? Possible Restrictions
of Television Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 45 B.U.L. REv. 651, 662 (1976) (the television advertisers were Bristol-Myers, HoffmanLaRoche, and Miles Laboratories).
89. Id.
90. The NAB Code, however, was subsequently amended to ban the television advertising of children's vitamins on children's T.V. Advertising Age, July 21, 1975 at 54, col. 2.
91. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,184 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Proposed Guide, Advertising of Children's Premiums on Television, 39 Fed. Reg.
25,505 (1974). Premiums, such as toys or games, exert an appeal extrinsic to the merits
of the product that they promote. Id.
94. Id. ,
95. Id. at 25,507. It was emphasized that for many years, premiums were considered an
unfair practice even when directed, toward adults, though such premium advertising is
now legally permitted.
96. Id. at 25,505.
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tion depicting advertising's effect on children as reasons for rejecting the
proposal, the Commission indicated it would continue to regulate children's
advertising on a case-by-case basis .

7

A recent consent decree again illustrates the FTC's intent to address
specific situations and to avoid the broad regulations necessary for adequate
protection.98 In Hudson PharmaceuticalCorp.99 the FTC accepted a consent
order prohibiting Hudson from advertising "Spider Man" and other vitamins
to child audiences. Although it failed to issue a broad trade rule, the Commission did state that such advertising may be unfair to children because
they are "unqualified by age and experience to decide whether or not they
need vitamins in general or should use an advertised brand in particular.1°0
This avoidance of broad trade rules and the documented evidence showing the unfairness of children's advertising has again been brought to the forefront by the current staff proposal to promulgate an industry-wide rule to
restrict children's advertising. The staff report asserts that it is unfair to
address "televised advertising for any product to young children who are
still too young to understand the selling purpose of, or otherwise comprehend or evaluate, the advertising .... ,,101
The current history of the FTC thus indicates that the unfairness prohibition has retained some vitality in the context of children's advertising. To
date, this vitality has only surfaced through a case-by-case analysis rather
than through issuance of a broad rule encompassing the entire television
advertising industry. 10 2 With the current evidentiary support from the
scientific community, however, the FTC staff's proposed regulation should
be sustainable.
The Deception Charge- Its History and Application
The FTC staff has also indicated that it may seek to restrict children's
97. Statement of Reasons for Rejecting the Proposed Guide on Television Advertising

of Premiums to Children, 42 Fed. Reg. 15,069 (1977). Cf. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,229
(1975) (declining to issue a per se ban on children's food advertising in favor of a case-bycase approach).
98. 16 C.F.R. §§2.31-.35 (1977). In the consent order procedure, the respondent is
served with a proposed complaint. If an agreement is reached, a consent order embodying
the agreement is issued. This order has the binding effect of a fully litigated disposition.
99. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (COR) 2l,191 (1976).
100. Id. The Commission alleged further that unfairness and deception may result
because: " (2) the use of a hero figure from a popular children's television program in

advertising has the tendency to blur for children the distinction between program content
and
and
lead
and

advertising and to take advantage of the trust relationship developed between children
the program character; (3) the use of such a figure to endorse children's vitamins can
significant numbers of children to believe that the endorsed product has qualities
characteristics it does not have; and (4) such advertising can induce children to taken

[sic] excessive amounts of vitamins, which can be dangerous to their health." Id.
101. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 157. The staff also stresses the unequal positions
of sophisticated advertisers and the credulous child. Id. at 185-86.
102. Former Commissioner Mary Gardner Jones expressed the fear that "unfairness" is
too subjective and that the case-by-case application is necessary to "flesh out" its definition.

Broadcasting Magazine, June 10, 1974 at 19.
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advertising on the basis of its being deceptive or misleading.-0 3 Section 5 of
the FTC Act provides that deceptive acts or practices in commerce are unlawful. 0 1 The FTC has held previously that proof of actual deception or injury
is. not required;0 5 and mere "capacity" or "tendency" to deceive is sufficient
to sustain the charge. 0 In determining whether an ad has the capacity to
deceive, the Commission uses an intelligence standard considerably below
that of tort law's "reasonable man."'10 7 The Supreme Court in 1937 interpreted Section 5 to "protect the trusting as well as the suspicious,"' 1° but
the FTC and the courts have since expanded this holding to include protection of "that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous."'' 9 Of important relevance in the children's advertising
area are holdings by the FTC that in evaluating the capacity to deceive, the
impression of the target audience will be controlling. Moreover, the FTC
has held that if an especially vulnerable group such as children is targeted,
the truthfulness of the advertisement will depend upon its impact on that
group." With this concept of deception, the FTC has carefully scrutinized
advertising directed toward children to detect any potentially deceptive
practices that might not be prohibited if the ads were aimed at adults.
In Wilson Chemical Co." . the Commission found that the respondent's
comic book advertisements deceptively induced unqualified and inexperienced
children to become salespersons for the respqndent. The ads enticed children
to send in a signed coupon by representing that "free" goods would be sent
without obligation. By mailing in the coupon, "however, a. child actually committed himself to receive and sell a package of respondent's products. When
payment for the unwanted merchandise was not forthcoming, the respondent issued threatening and deceptive letters. The Commission found theseto be "strong letters to send to adults. . . . [T]heir coercive nature is increased when it is considered that in the majority of cases the recipients of
these letters are probably children." 1 2 This special concern with the vulnerability, innocence and inexperience of children has repeatedly surfaced in

103.

STAFF REPORT,

supra note 4, at 157.

104. 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1) (1976).
105. ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 953 (1973).
106. FrC V. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 151 (1942); Vacu-Matic Carburetor. Co. v. FTC,
157 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1946); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
679, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). See also, Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 17 KANsAs L. REV. 559 (1969); Reich, Consumer Protection and the
First Amendment-A Dilemma for the FTC, 61 MINN. L. REv. 705, 708 (1977); Psychological Advertising, supra note 40, at 1100.
107. W. PROSSER, TiH LAw or ToRTs 149 (1971).
108. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
109. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th CirL 1942), citing Florence Mfg. Co. v.
J.C. Doud & Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
110. HAV. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963). However, the Kirchner decision also
notes that deception will not apply to the extreme cases of absurd feebleminded misconceptions. Id.
111. 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964).
112. Id. at 183.
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the Commission's deceptive advertising decisions, particularly in the realm
of toy"13

and food advertisements."14
The FTC has also imposed special disclosure requirements on the labelling and advertising of certain products due to the unique credulity of the
child consumer. In seeking an affirmative disclosure order for certain children's toy packaging, the Commission admitted that normally there was no
requirement to disclose risks of breakage if those risks are obvious, but added
that the failure to disclose may be deceptive when children are the principal
consumers of the product and cannot readily discern such risks.11 5 Affirmative
disclosure, however, may not adequately eradicate the deceptiveness in children's advertising. In Sunshine Art Studios," 6 concerning the solicitation of
greeting card salespersons through children's magazines, the evidence showed
that a number of children
cards. Unknowingly, they
successive shipments. The
spondent's customers were
disclose this commitment

believed they were ordering a single shipment of
were in fact committing themselves to receiving
Commission found that because many of the rechildren, the administrative law judge's order to
for future shipments would not adequately pro-

113. See, e.g., Topper Corp., 79 F.T.C. 681 (1971); Mattel, Inc., 79 F.T.C. 667 (1971).
In Mattel and Topper the Commission specifically prohibited film or camera techniques
which misrepresented product performance in the ages of a child to whom the ad is
directed, and also prohibited: (1) endorsement by famous personalities who had no competence to form a judgment about the toy; (2) advertising incompatible toys under the
same brand, absent disclosure of the incompatibility; and (3) including two or more toys
in one commercial, which must be purchased separately, absent disclosure. See Ideal Toy
Corp., 64 F.T.C. 297 (1964), in which the Commission found that respondent's "deceptive
advertising claims thus unfairly exploit a consumer group unqualified by age or experience
to anticipate or appreciate the possibility that the representations may be exaggerated or
untrue." Id. at 299. See also, Emenee Industries, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 662 (1964); American Doll
& Toy Corp., 66 F.T.C. 658 (1964); Rainbow Crafts, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 655 (1964).
114. See, e.g., Uncle Ben's, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,246 (1977) (finding
that a commercial depicting a four-year-old child helping her mother cook rice was deceptive
in influencing children to wander close to cooking foods or attempt to cook themselves
and thus induce harm); ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1976); Hudson
Pharmaceutical Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 121,191 (1976). See General Foods Corp.,
86 F.T.C. 8al (1975), in which the Commission found that cereal commercials portraying
Euell Gibbons gathering nuts, berries, etc. for breakfast while espousing the goodness of
Post Grapenuts, were deceptive and harmful to children. Considering the insufficient knowledge or experience of children, the ads had the capacity to influence children to eat harmful plants and were thus deceptive. See also 1976-1 Trade Cases 160,942 (1976) (respondents
charged with misleading children into the mistaken belief that respondent's ready-to-eat
(RTE) cereals are different from other RTE cereals, thus creating artificial brand differentiation and brand proliferation).
115. Stupell Enterprises, Etc., 67 F.T.C. 173, 187 (1965). The Commission also noted
that the low price of the product may be indicative of the class of consumers- children
-the
toy will reach. The Commission has also recognized that the consumer may be
entitled to expect that a product can be used safetly in absence of any warning to the
contrary. See Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Mck. Edwards, 34 F.T.C. 619
(1942).
116. 81 F.T.C. 836 (1972).
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tect them. 117 The Commission therefore ordered a limit as to the time period
and number of shipments. 118
The requirement of affirmative disclosure has been used more frequently
when the deceptive advertisement concerned food, drugs, devices and cosmetics." 9 Section 15 of the FTC Act 12 0 deals specifically with advertisements
in this area and has been found by the FTC to impose a strict duty of disclosure upon sellers whose products pose a potential health danger to unsuspecting target consumers.' 2 ' In their proposed regulation of children's
advertising, the Commission staff has sought to include candy and cereal
advertisements in the regulations under sections 5, 12 and 15.122 Based on the
numerous studies evaluating the tendency of such products to cause dental
decay,123 the staff has found these sugar-promoting ads to be deceptive because they do not reveal the health risks involved.1 2 4 The staff additionally
points out that in the case of young children, the requirement of affirmative
disclosure of the health risks involved may be ineffective due to children's
inability to understand or perhaps even perceive such disclosures. 25 Thus,

the staff recommends an outright ban where children, ages eight and below,
8

are concerned12
At least one commentator, however, strongly disfavors the broad restriction on children's advertising through the deception charge. Gerald Thain,
a former Assistant Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, believes
the FTC should not base its regulation on a finding of implicit deception,
since the mere advertising of a product will always imply certain propositions. Consequently, without the disclosure of adverse information, any ad
could be considered deceptive. 2 7 The fear exists that the scope of the implied
117.

Id. at 888.

118. Id.

119. 15 US.C. §52 (1976).
120. Id. §55.
121. E.g., Ultra-Violet Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1944); American
Medicinal Prods', Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943); Lanolin Plus, Inc., 61 F.T.C.
534 (1962). Of particular relevance to this disclosure requirement is a phenomenon discovered by child behavioralists. They found that a child watches the upper-left-hand
quadrant of the television screen more than any other, and that he pays the least attention to the bottom-right-hand quadrant. At one congressional hearing, members were shown
televised commercials which contained action in the top left-hand corner while usage
warnings were pictured at the bottom. This type of presentation would be deceptive even
to a literate child. FTC Amendment Hearings, supra note 17, at 367, 371. See also Handler,
The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
91 (1939).

122. STAFF PEPORT, supra note 4, at 159.
123. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
124. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 164-69.
125. Id. at 305-08. Foreign countries require types-of affirmative disclosures which may
be understood by even fairly young children. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at
310-11 (the Netherlands bans sugared food advertisements until 7:55 p.m., and, thereafter; advertisers must picture a stylized toothbrush on the screen during a portion of
the commercial).
126. These same ideas of deception surfaced before in the Cigarette Rule. See note
72 supra and accompanying text.
127. Thain, supra note 88, at 667-70. In fact, deception could be found inherent in
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deception charge could encompass almost all advertising. Although industry
spokesmen have also asserted that misleading commercials probably affect
children less than they do adults, 128 the history of FTC involvement in the
children's advertising field indicates the Commisison will not favor such a
viewpoint. Despite serious concern over the application of the deception
charge and its potential for unlimited expansion, however, the FTC nevertheless appears to have the rational basis and legal precedent to severely
curtail advertising on children's television.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

First Amendment Rights of Advertisers
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen deemed purely
commercial speech to be constitutionally unprotected.12 9 However, in the
recent case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., the Court overruled Valentine and found pure commercial advertising within the penumbra of first amendment protection.'2 0
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court found unconstitutional a
state ban on prescription drug advertising and declared that an advertiser
has a right to disseminate truthful information coincidental with the public's
right to receive such information. 13 1 In granting first amendment protection,
the Court stressed the abrogation of the paternalistic approach in favor of
permitting the free flow of information necessary for formulation of intelligent opinions and proper resource allocation.132 The Court reasoned that
this free flow will result in informed persons who can perceive their own
best interests. 33 Such language, taken at face value, may provide advertisers
with precedent to invalidate regulations restricting advertising directed to
children. 3 4 Advertising proponents have steadfastly asserted that children's
advertising is necessary for the consumer socialization of a child, development of his purchasing experience and preparation for future decision-makthe very nature of advertising. A member of a prominent advertising agency states that a
principal means through which advertising persuades is by "adding a value not in the
product." J. Treasure, How Advertising Works, ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 150 (Y. Brozen
ed. 1974). See also Bever, supra note 27, at 119 ("advertising may accidentally mislead children because it is based on communication habits that only adults can understand").
128. National Nutrition, supra note 23, at 32. ("The notion of the 'innocent child',
seduced or beguiled by TV advertising is an adult fairy tale and adult self-deception. Misleading or false TV advertising probably has less effect and impact on children than it
does on adults. . . . The child is far more apt to question what he sees than is an adult.").
But see Bever, supra note 27, at 27.
129. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
130. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
Linmark Assocs. Inc., v. Township of WVillingsboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).

(1977);

425 U.S. at 756-57.
Id. at 765.
133. Id. at 770.
134. One court of appeals has already suggested that the courts must scrutinize the
Commission's action more strictly now. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20
131.

132.

(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977). See generally Reich, supra
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ing.135 Children's advertising, however, cannot be so readily fitted into the

language of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. The available research suggests that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy would be inapplicable to advertising addressed to children because children are incapable of comprehending and interpreting that free flow of information with which the Court
was concerned. 13 6
Moreover, the Court emphasized that there are "commonsense differences"
between commercial speech and other types of speech, justifying a different
degree of protection. 37 Stating that "some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible," the Court nonetheless found untruthful, false,
deceptive or misleading commercial speech the proper- subject of regulation. 13s While this language would obviously allow the banning of children's
advertising if the staff proposal's charge of deception were supported by the
facts, s9 no clear-cut language in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy would
authorize regulation if the unfairness charge were sustained. Even in the
absence of express language holding that unfair advertising is outside the
scope of first amendment protection, the opinion implies that such protection could be denied. In listing forms of commercial speech subject to regu135. J. HOWARD 8-J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 65. Industry could also point to favorable language in several Federal Communications Commission cases. See, e.g., Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which
is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by
the FCC."); Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974)
(separate view of Commissioner Washburn at 37-38, where he criticizes the over-emotionalizing of the children's advertising issue and warns of governmental control: "If the First
Amendment is to mean anything at all, it obviously does not mean that we can make
judgments on the basis of majoritarian sentiment alone.").
136. For a discussion of the child's perception of advertising see notes 25-55 supra
and accompanying text. The FTC has recognized that specific adult groups may also be
vulnerable. See S.S.S. Co., 73 F.T.C. 1058, 1092 (1968) (advertising directed to urban and
rural poor). See also Doris Savitch, 50 F.T.C. 828 (1954), aff'd sub norm, Savitch v. FTC,
218 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955). "A child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). It has even been suggested that this lack, of capacity imposes a fiduciary duty
upon advertisers to refrain from exploitive advertising. Wolinsky & Econome, Seduction
in Wonderland: The Need for a Sellcr's Fiduciary Duty Toward Children, 4 HASINGS
CONST. L.Q. 249 (1977).

137. 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24.
1,38. 'Id. at 770. The extent to which industry can use its new-found protected commercial speech right to influence children may have been further diminished in Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 n.37 (1977), in which the Court held: "The determination whether an advertisement is misleading requires consideration of the . . .sophistication of its audience. Thus different degree of regulation may be appropriate in different
cases."
139. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), (supplemental opinion
on petition for hearing). The court found that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy provided
no protection for deceptive advertising, interpreting the case to mean that restrictions
on advertising were constitutional if imposed to prevent the advertisement's being deceptive.
Id. at 768-71.
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lation, the Court carefully pointed out that "[w]e mention a few only to
make clear that they are not before us and therefore are not foreclosed by
this case.' 140 Moreover, the Court was concerned with the flow of "legitimate" commercial information, 14 and, arguably, exploitative children's ad1
vertising is not legitimate. 42
Although only briefly mentioned by the Court, an important aspect of
first amendment protection for commercial speech is the issue of time, place
and manner restrictions. The Supreme Court held in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy that a state cannot completely suppress the dissemination of
truthful commercial advertising. Time, place and manner restrictions, however, are permissible if the government's interest in regulation is significant,
if sufficient alternative channels for communication are available, and if such
43
restrictions are not based on the content of the speech.1
The Court's permissive attitude toward time, place and manner restrictions44 is of particular importance because the FTC staff has employed this
mode of regulation in its children's advertising proposal. 45 The first two
requirements of permissible time, place and manner restrictions dictated by
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy are readily met. First, the proposal is based
on a significant governmental interest in the protection of children from
the harmful effects of television advertising.' 4 Second, the restrictions generally cover only children's programming, leaving numerous alternative
channels of communication available. 47 Advertisers may advertise their
products not only in the print media, but also on television at later hours
when children do not constitute a significant proportion of the audience.
The third requirement, however, might not be technically satisfied. The proposal's emphasis on advertising addressed to children and advertising of
140. 425 U.S. at 770.
141. Id. at 771 n.24.
142. But see id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing that the Court's decision
requires the allowance of advertising for liquor, cigarettes and other products which
heretofore had been discouraged and/or prohibited).
143. Id. at 771. The particular importance of this time, place and manner restriction
is evidenced in a recent suit brought by a nine-year-old girl who was sexually assaulted
by four older girls allegedly imitating an NBC movie dramatizing a similar crime. Negligence
is claimed for improper time, place and manner of telecasting -specifically when juveniles
would be in the audience. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383,
141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Ist App. Dist. 1977). The Supreme Court refused an appeal by the
defendants to dismiss on free speech grounds and ordered the case to go to trial. National
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Neimi, 46 U.S.L.W. 3659 (April 25, 1978).
144. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2025 n.29 (1977) (refusing
to sustain the total suppression of contraceptive advertising, but leaving open the question
whether state interests could justify time, place, and manner restriction of such commercial advertising). "Laws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on a
different footing than laws prohibiting speech altogether." Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro, 97 S. Ct. 161., 1619 (1977). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1,972); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949).
145. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
146. See notes 27-50 supra and accompanying text.
147. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5024 n.28 (July 3, 1978).
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sugared food products could conceivably be construed as content regulation. 1 4
Three Supreme Court Justices have recently stated, however, that content is
always a critical element of first amendment analysis and that the first amendment does not prohibit all government regulation that is based on content
of speech.149 Additionally, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,3 0 the Court
held that the constitutional protection afforded commercial speech is largely
governed by the content of the communication, and recognized that such
speech is not entitled to first amendment protection in all places.' 51 This
viewpoint was again expressed by Justice Powell, concurring in Carey v. Popu2
'He
stated that, although commercial speech
lation Services International~.1
is entitled to protection, such speech is not necessarily entitled to protection
in all places and at all times. 58 Recent Supreme Court decisions thus establish the principle that protection afforded commercial speech is determined
by content, foreclosing any assertion by advertisers that the staff proposal
is an impermissible content regulation. Moreover, the broadcasting media
have been considered especially appropriate for time, place and manner restrictions. 54 The FTC, therefore, has an adequate precedential basis from
which to impose time, place and manner restrictions on television advertising,
despite the relatively new first amendment protection afforded commercial
speech under Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.
The broadcasting industry may further claim that the FTC's proposed
regulations constitute an invalid prior restraint under the first amendment.
An invalid prior restraint generally consists of an infringement upon the first
amendment right to disseminate information by requiring a prior determina148. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
149. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5022 (July 3, 1978). Additionally,
two other Justices stated that content is a critical element of first amendment analysis
only in the commercial speech context. Id. at 5027, n.3. Thus, a majority of five Justices
would examine the content of commercial speech in determining the amount of first
amendment protection deserved.

150. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
151. Id. at 68-69. "The measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial
speech will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication." Id. Even
four dissenting Justices in Young agreed that time, place and manner regulation need
not be content neutral in the context of a juvenile audience. Id. at 85-86. With regard
to place restrictions, see, e.g., Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439
P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed (for want of a substantial federal question), 393 U.S. 3'16
(1969) (upholding a state statute permitting billboards to advertise businesses located on
the premises but not those located elsewhere).
152. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
153. Id. at 2030 n.6 (1977). See also Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
154. 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2030 n.6 (1977). In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court
recognized that each method of communication presents its own ,special first amendment
problems. 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). Subsequently, in Bates and Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy the Court found that the broadcast media warrant speial consideration, but
left unresolved the reach of constitutional protection of commercial speech. 433 U.S. 350,
384 (1977), 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976). Finally, in FCC v. -acifica Foundation, the Court
admitted that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection." 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5023 (July 3, 1978).
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tion as to whether the material is protected. 155 Traditionally, the Supreme
Court has condemned any restraint imposed by a public official denying
access to a specific forum prior to the expression.15c The FTC staff proposal
constitutes an analagous advance governmental denial of specific advertising
rights with respect to the television forum, and could therefore be subject to
constitutional condemnation. Scientific research and experimentation, however, might provide the FTC with a defense to the prior restraint problem.
Even though prior restraints are presumed unconstitutional, 157 that presumption may be overcome by evidence of a societal interest sufficient to justify an
exception to first amendment protection. 15 The abundant research finding

advertising injurious to the psychological and physiological well-being of

children5 9 could well overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality.
A significant case in the area of prior restraint, Writers Guild of America,
6
West, Inc. v. FCC,
So
concerned the FCC's involvement in coercing broadcasting networks to adopt the Family Viewing Hour policy.161 Various writers,
actors, directors and producers claimed violation of their first amendment
rights to air protected speech in the 7:00-9:00 p.m. time slot. In holding for
the plaintiffs, the court emphasized that the FCC never asserted that the
subject matter in question was unprotected, nor did the Commission contend that the Family Viewing Hour policy was supported by evidence sufficient to create an exception to free speech.1 62 The court recognized that the
FCC could conceivably compile a record evaluating the question of sex,

155. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1065); Gulf State Theatres of La.,
Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489 (La. 1973); State v. I, A Woman -Part II, 53 Wis.
2d 102, 191 N.W.2d 897 (197-11).
156. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
157. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See also Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
158. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
7-16 (1931); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976). Only a serious aid compelling societal interest should be permited to override free
speech protection. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The Court has cautioned, however, that mere public sentiment and animosity cannot justify infringement
of first amendment freedoms. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
159. See notes 27-50 supra and accompanying text. The attempt by the FTC staff
proposal to prevent future injury may be compared to the ban on televised cigarette
advertising. Pub. L. No. 91-222 (April 1, 1970), 15 U.S.C. §1335 (1970). See also Trade
Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (Statement of Basis and Purpose); Note, Prior Restraints and Restrictions on Advertising After
Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REv.
64, 87 (1978).
160. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
161. The purpose of the Family Viewing Hour policy was to prohibit programming
containing sex and violence during the 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. time slot. Note, The Family
Viewing Hour: An Assault on the First Amendment?, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935, 936-37
(1977). See also, NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF BROADCASTING, THE TELEVISION CODE 2-3 (18th
ed. 1975).
162. 423 F. Supp. at 1149.
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violence and children's programming during the early evening hours, which
would constitutionally justify a policy similar to the Family Viewing Hour.163
Thus, the Writers Guild court, though finding a first amendment violation
where protection of children was at issue, left unanswered the question as
to whether similar restrictive programming policy could be validated upon
sufficient record evidence of societal interest. In the scheduled hearings on
the FTC staff proposal,'- the Commission will determine whether such a
record can be compiled.
The decisions of recent cases in the commercial speech area, have undeniably granted advertisers first amendment protection. The exceptions to
this general grant, however, would apparently foreclose protection if advertising to children is found, on the basis of substantial evidence, to be deceptive
or unfair.
The First Amendment Rights of Adult Viewers
In promulgating any restrictions based on the uniqueness of the broadcast media and protection of children, the first amendment rights of adult
viewers cannot be ignored. In Pacifica Foundation165 the FCC found the content of a certain comedy record "indecent" and prohibited its future broadcast. " 6 In supporting its order, the FCC emphasized the intrusive nature of the
broadcast media and the likelihood that many children would be in the radio
audience at the time that this particular record was aired.16 7 On appeal, the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the uniqueness of the
broadcasting media and the presence of children in the audience did not
save the FCC regulation from overbreadth and vagueness.168 The appellate
163. "It may be, for example, that a record could be compiled that would demonstrate that particular types of programming are so demonstrably injurious to the public
health that their entitlement to First Amendment protection in the broadcasting medium
could properly be quesioned." Id.
164. See note 12 supra.

165. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
166. The record contained a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words", by
comedian George Carlin. During his monologue, Carlin listed the seven dirty words "you
couldn't say on the public . . . ainvaves" and proceeded to repeat them in a variety of
colloquialisms. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5024 (July 3, 1978)
(appendix). This record was played by a New York radio station at approximately 2 o'clock
on a weekday afternoon. A father who heard the broadcast while driving with his son
complained to the FCC which subsequently issued the declaratory order, holding that
Pacifica could have been subject to administrative sanctions. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975).
The FCC found the power to regulate "indecent" broadcasting under two statutes: 18
U.S.C. §1464 (forbidding "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication") and 47 U.S.C. §303(b) (requiring the FCC to "encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest'). See also Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulating Practices, 84 HAv. L. REv. 664
(1971).
167. 67 F.C.C.2d at 98.
168. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally Schneyer,
An Overview of Public Interest Law Activity in the Communications Field, 1977 Wis. L.
REv. 619; Recent Decisions-First Amendment-Broadcasting-Offensive Language-Neither
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court determined that the FCC's broad ruling would prohibit the broadcasting of otherwise protected speech until 1:30 a.m., when the number of
children in the audience falls below one million. 169 According to the court,
this ruling would effectively limit the adult population to viewing and hearing only that which is fit for children during prime broadcasting hours.170
The appellate court's reasoning, however, failed to convince the Supreme
Court that an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights had
occurred. Recently, the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation1 7l held that
communications through the broadcasting media deserve minimal first amendment protection for two principal reasons. First, broadcasting has established
a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. 17 -2 Second, the
broadcasting media is uniquely accessible to children. 7 3 Moreover, adults
the Special Characteristics of Broadcasting nor the Probable Presence of Children in the
Audience Justifies Overbroad and Vague Regulation of Indecent Language by the F.C.C., 11
GA. L. Rav. 951 (1977).
169. 556 F.2d at 14. This information was taken from an Amicus" Brief quoting Statement of John A. Schneider, before the House Subcommittee on Communications, July 15,
1975, at 9.
170. Id. at 17. The court referred to Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) and
called this regulation a "classic case of burning the house to roast the pig." The court
also noted that the FCC's order would prohibit the broadcasting of several great works of
literature including those of Shakespeare, Byron, Hemingway, the Nixon Tapes and the
Bible. 556 F.2d at 14-T7. But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5024
(July 3, 1978) (the Supreme Court emphasizing that its decision did not justify the sanctioning of an occasional expletive no matter what the context).
171. 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (July 3, 1978).
172. Id. at 5023-24. The Court felt that the unique pervasiveness of broadcasting created
an invasion of privacy interests. In rejecting the appellate court's conclusion that the
ability to avoid offense by simply turning off the radio was a sufficient protection of privacy,
the Court said: "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when
he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow." Id. Similarly, in Branzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), different treatment under the first amendment for television communication was justified because a "television watcher can avoid these commericals only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel, or doing some other
such affirmative act." See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political ads in buses); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 127 (1973) (holding that television viewers are a captive audience); Rowan v. Post
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (unwanted mail); Kovacs V. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1049)
(sound trucks). But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5028 (July 3, 1978)
(dissenting opinion) (privacy interests are not infringed where the individual voluntarily
chooses to turn the radio on); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)
(stating that a person could avoid an offensive drive-in movie simply by averting his
eyes); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that a person offended
by
the profane language on the defendant's jacket could avoid embarrassment by averting
his eyes); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) ("the radio can be turned off").
In the children's advertising context, however, the argument that turning off a broadcast
constitutes sufficient protection fails to account for the public interest function of television. Television broadcasters are required to operate in the public interest and consequently must provide suitable programming for children. See notes 221-225 infra and
accompanying text.
173. 46 U.S.L.W. at 5024. See also Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d 397, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which the broadcast of explicit sexual techniques
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still have access to "questionable material" through attendance at theatres
and nightclubs, or purchase of records and tapes. 74 In dictum, the Court also
suggested that broadcasting such speech may be permissible in the late evening
when fewer children are likely to be in the audience. 175 Thus, adults were
not limited to hearing only material fit for children as the appellate court
envisioned.
Although FCC v. Pacifica Foundation dealt with the broadcasting
of indecent language, the Court's perceptible balancing process is pertinent
to the children's advertising problem. Adult viewers of children's programs
can receive the same commercial information from magazines, newespapers,
and even television at perhaps a different time of day or on a different program. Adults thus have easier access to commercial information under the
FTC's proposed regulations than to "indecent" language under the FCC's
order. Arguably, the rights of adult viewers are therefore outweighed in the
first amendment balancing process.
The First Amendment Rights of Children
As previously discussedy17 the first amendment right to receive information 77 may be inapplicable to young children because of their inability to
perceive the purpose behind advertising. The debate over the child's right
to receive such advertising extends -beyond the commercial speech context
to the significance of the Constitution as a whole with respect to children's
rights. Although the Court has recognized that minors certainly possess constitutional rights,'7 s it has also held that "the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults."' 79 Court decisions and legal literature emphasizing this distinction
are varied and numerous. A landmark example is Prince v. Massachusetts,5 0
in which the Court upheld a state child labor law, declaring that the state's
protection of children from the abuses of labor practices outweighed the first
amendment right of children to the-free exercise of religion.','
over the radio at a time when children may be in the audience was found to be obscene

and unprotected by the first amendment.
174. Id. at 5024 n.28.
175. Id. The Court apparently relied on the FCC's second opinion concerning this

case, which declared that the Commission "never intended to place an absolute prohibition
on the broadcast of this type of language, but.rather sought to channel it to times of day
when children most likely would not be exposed to it." 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
176. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
177. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425

U.S. at 756: "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists,
...the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both." See also Kleindeist v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (referring to a first amend-

ment right to receive information and ideas).
178. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
179. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
180. 321 U.S. 158 ,(1943).

181. "It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well developed men and citizens." Id. at 165.
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Within the protected speech versus obscenity context, the Supreme Court
in Ginsberg v. New York"', held that what is protected literature for adults
may be prohibited from distribution to children because a child does not
possess "that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition
of first amendment guarantees.'1' 3 The Court thus rejected the appellant's
contention that the New York statute, according minors a more restricted
right to determine what sex-oriented material they may read or see, was an
unconstitutional infringement of a minor's first amendment guarantees.184
The legal significance of this "lack of capacity" has been demonstrated 18 5
in criminal, 1

6

tort, 87 and contract law. 88

182. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court also announced a concept of "variable obscenity,"
stating that "the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the
group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined." Id.
at 636, citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y. 2d 71, 75, 218 N.E. 2d 668, 671 (1966).
183. Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J. concurring). Minors have consistently been afforded
special treatment in the obscenity area. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973); Interstate Circuit v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968); Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463, 498 n.1 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 779 (1978). See generally Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Note, Constitutional
Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting Children, 54 GEo. L.J. 1379 (1966). Justice
Powell, concurring in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5026 (1978), recognized
that certain "indecent" speech may have a longer lasting and more injurious effect on a
child than on an adult. Because of this damaging impact and a child's inability to protect
himself, Powell favored the FCC's restrictions on the general dissemination of such speech
to children.
184. Other constitutionally protected rights have been restricted according to the
age of the person asserting them. For example, the twenty-sixth amendment extends the
right to vote only to those eighteen or over. The U.S. CONST. art. I §§2, 3 and art. II §I limit
the public offices of representative, senator, and president on the basis of age. The right to
many has been limited by age in most states. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d. 120
(La. 1975); Walter v. Walter, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968). The right to travel
has been restricted by age through the driver's licensing requirements of each state.
See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34 (1930).
185. "The infant has always been a favorite of the law. From early times the common
law has made exceptions to the ordinary rules of law to compensate for the mental immaturity of persons in the adolescent period of life. The infant has been given certain
special rights and privileges, and at the same time has had imposed upon his certain
disabilities, all intended to afford him special protection." 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws 3 (1938).
186. At common law, criminal incapacity was presumed by those below the age of
fourteen, while today's juvenile court systems generally withdraw those under eighteen
from the normal criminal processes. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 352, 354 (1872).
187. In general tort law, a child need only conform to a standard of care of a
"reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like circumstances," not
to the reasonable man standard applicable to adults. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§283A (1965). Cf. W. PROsSER, LAw OF TORTS §32 at 154-57 (1971). An adult is also required

to treat trespassing children with a higher degree of care than he would adults under the
attractive nuisance doctrine. Id. §59. "Because of his immaturity and want of judgment, the
child may be incapable of understanding and appreciating all of the possible dangers
which he may encounter in trespassing, or of making his own intelligent decisions as to
the chances he will take." Id. at 364. See also the "pied piper" negligence suits concerning
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Thus Supreme Court precedent and traditional common law principles
suggest that due to lack of capacity and resultant exploitation, the Constitution permits different treatment of children. Consequently, the FTC's protection of children from unfair and deceptive advertising arguably could out8 9
weigh any first amendment interest of children in receiving such advertising.
Before the FTC issues its final rule, however, it must contend with the
Supreme Court's demonstrated intention to scrutinize carefully any attempt
to withhold from children speech protected in other contexts. In Tinker v.
enticement of children (e.g., Garza v. Perez, 443 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Hastings
v. Smith, 223 Tenn. -142, 443 S.W.2d 436 (1969); Thomas v. Goodies Ice Cream Co., 13 Ohio
App. 2d 67, 233 N.E.2d 876 (1968)).
188. Perhaps the common law principle most relevant to the issue at hand is found
in contract law. To protect children from commercial exploitation, a basic contract rule
has been formulated which generally allows an infant to avoid the contractual obligations
he enters into before reaching the age of twenty-one. The right of the infant to avoid his
contracts is one conferred by law for his protection against his own improvidence and the
designs of others. In re O'Leary's Estate, 3,52 Pa. 254, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (1945). See also 2
WILLISTON ON CONTRACrS §§222-248 (3d ed. 1959). The protection of children under contract law is of ancient origin. Under the Code of Hammurabi (circa 2250 B.C.), anyone
buying or receiving from a minor without the consent of elders or the power of attorney
faced the death penalty. Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law,
87 U. PA. L. REV. 426, 428 (1939). The major exception to this doctrine is that a child
is liable for the reasonable value of necessities. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §240. In effect,
one who deals with a minor does so at his own peril and may suffer seemingly inequitable
hardships as a result. See Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940); Worman Motor
Co. v. Hill, 54 Ariz. 227, 94 P.2d 865 (1939); Pollock v. Indus. Accident Comm., 5 Cal. 2d
205, 54 P.2d 695 (1936). See generally Navin, The Contracts of Minors Viewed from the
Perspective of Fair Exchange, 50 N.C.L. REV. 517 (1972). Furthermore, contract law provides that a child may avoid contract responsibilities, even though his parents approved
of the transaction. See, e.g., Schmidgall v. Engelke, 224 N.E.2d 590 (111. App. 1967); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 13 Misc. 2d 8, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Hines
v. Cheshire, 36 Wash. 2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950); Bombardier v. Goodrich, 94 Vt. 208,
110 A. 11 (1920).
189. Advertisers have vehemently protested that parents, not the FTC, should be
responsible for what particular communications their children receive. NEWSWEEK, supra
note 16, at 75. The problem with this contention is that it presupposes a parent's ability
to control his children's viewing habits continuously. In his dissenting opinion to Pacifica
Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Judge Leventhal found on the basis
of recent statistics that the majority of mothers with school-age children work and that
20% of United States children live with only one parent. He logically deduced that many
children were thus left unsupervised. See also Lyle & Hoffman, Patterns of Television
Viewing by Pre-School Age Children, CHILDREN AND TELEVISION 48 (R. Brown ed. 1976).
The courts have also recognized the limitations of parental guidance: "While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental
control or guidance cannot always be provided and society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to
them." People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965), cited in
Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. 629, 630 (1-968); "What may be wholly permissible for
adults therefore may not be so for children, either with or without their parents' presence."
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944). See also Comment, Exclusion of Children from
Violent Movies, 67 COL. L. REv. 1149 (1967); Comment, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 14,1
(1959). ,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss5/6

26

Wattwood: FTC Regulation of TV Advertising to Children--The Deserve a Break
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

Des Moines Independent Community School District9 " the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of a school policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands
for protest purposes. Ruling in favor of the students, the Court stated that
students should not be regarded as passive recipients of only that information
which the state deems appropriate for them.191 Similarly, the Court declared
in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 92 that protected speech could only be
denied to children in narrowly defined circumstances.19s In that case, the Court
found unconstitutional a municipal ordinance banning exhibition of certain
movies on screens visible from the public streets. Specifically, the ordinance
prohibited the outdoor showing of movies "in which human male or female
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are
shown." 194 The City of Jacksonville argued that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power to protect children. The Court, however, felt the
ordinance also sweepingly prohibited speech which would not be considered
obscene even when viewed by minors, and was thus overbroad.' 95 Similar
problems of overbreadth and vagueness confront the current FTC staff proposal due to the incorporation of ambiguous terminology.'9 6 This staff
proposal, however, is not the final draft of the proposed rule. The proposal
is further subject to rulemaking proceedings and modifications; vague or
overbroad language should be eliminated or narrowly defined before final
codification.' 9 7
The Fifth Amendment Rights of Advertisers
The emphasis of the FTC staff's new proposal on severely restricting
television advertising to children has brought renewed claims of regulatory
discrimination from the broadcasting industry. 98 Although the banning of
advertising from children's programs will obviously subject the television
medium to regulation not imposed upon the other communications media, 99
190.
191.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 511.

192. 422 U.S. 205 .(1975).
193. ld. at 218.
194. Id. at 207. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
195. 422 U.S. at 213. The Court felt this statute was broad enough to bar movies
containing the nude body of a war victim, scenes from a culture in which nudity is
indigenous or even a picture of a baby's buttocks. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968), in which the Court stated, "Nor is it an answer to an
argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague to say that it was adopted
for the salutary purpose of protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness is
not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the power to regulate or
control expression with respect to children."
196. For example, the proposal seeks to ban advertising seen by audiences composed
of a "significant proportion" of young children. "Significant proportion" is certainly capable of wide and varying interpretation. Additionally, the proposal seeks to ban the
advertising of "sugared food products" to children. This ban could conceivably include a
product containing only a minimal amount of sugar. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
197. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
198. See generally Broadcasting Magazine, June 10, 1974, at 18.
199. But see Wall St. J., April 21, 1978, at 1, col. 3 (announcing investigation, by an
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the constitutional question is whether a legitimate basis exists for making
such distinction. Current case law suggests that a legitimate basis does indeed
2
00 the Court declined to enjoin
exist. In CapitalBroadcasting Co. v. MitcheU1
enforcement of Section 6 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969,201 stressing the unique characteristics of the television communication
medium. 202 In rejecting the broadcaster's contention that the prohibtion on
televised cigarette advertisements was arbitrary and invidious, 202 the Court
20 4
emphasized data proving that television advertising was extremely pervasive
205
Young people were found to place
and effective in reaching young people.
than
upon the print media. 20 Another
broadcast
media
a greater reliance upon
important distinction is that written advertisements can be reread and evaluated in the presence of an adult.2 0 7 Television commercials presently provide
no means of retrieval- consequently, the parent must actually view the television with the child and attempt to discuss the fleeting advertisements. A
further distinction involves the realistic presumption that written advertisements are generally directed toward adults and older children rather than
toward young children who are either preliterate or semiliterate. 208 Finally,
the broadcasting media can be differentiated from the print media on the
basis of an inherent public-private dichotomy. Airwaves have been historically regarded as owned by the public, the broadcasters licensed to operate
in the public interest.209 The print media, on the other hand, are generally
FTC regional office, into deceptive comic book advertising); Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff21,191 (1976) (prohibiting the advertising of vitamins through
printed advertisements whose dominant appeal is to children).
200. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd sub nom., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
201. 15 U.S.C. §1335 (1970) (making illegal the advertisement of cigarettes on any
electronic broadcasting medium).
202. 333 F. Supp. at 584. See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 226-27 (1943); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also notes 154 & 172 supra and accompanying text.
203. 333 F. Supp. at 585. The court readily disposed of this contention: "The Fifth
Amendment does not compel legislatures 'to prohibit all like evils or none. A legislature
may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another.' ").
Id. at 586 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938)).
204. Id. at 585. See also S.R. REP. No. 91-566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1969), reprinted
in [1970] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2652, 2655-57.
205. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
206. Id. at 586. Cf. the effect of television advertising on the poor and minority disadvantaged, notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
207. Of course billboards, signs, placards, etc., could not be restricted.
208. Ironically, the Chairman of Phillip Morris stated: "I think further that broadcast is quite different from print media. We think that the print media appeals to a more
adult person and as such is a more appropriate place for cigarette ads." Hearings on H.R.
6543 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
115 (1969).

209. A broadcaster may be deprived of his license if the FCC decides such an action
would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § §309(a), 312(a) (2)
(1976); see notes 221-225 infra and accompanying text. But see Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). The court warned that complaints
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privately owned. This difference is crucial if governmental regulation is
involved. 210 Television can thus be legitimately singled out for regulations
that might be unconstitutional if applied to other forms of advertising media.
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

OF REGULATION

2 11

Although ignored in the FTC staff's proposal, an obvious problem with
eliminating or severely restricting advertising from children's programming
is the possibility of endangering the quality and quantity of children's television programs. Broadcasters assert that strict limitations on children's advertising will force them to eliminate children's programming -' - or to televise
poor quality shows 21 3 due to lack of funding. In response to a 1970 ACT
petition, 214 the FCC was forced to consider the economic realities of eliminating advertising to children. The FCC declined to act on the petition, citing
FTC control in this field 215 and the new amendments to the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) Code reducing commercial time216 as the more
reasonable solution to the problem. From an economic standpoint, the FCC

indicated there was an inelasticity of demand for advertising on children's
programs. This inelasticity means that a reduction in commercials would not

substantially affect revenue, since the price of remaining ad time would
increase proportionately2 17 The FCC concluded, therefore, that reduction
of FCC regulation of advertising could not be answered by the "mere recitation of . . .
the conclusory propositions that the 'public owns the airwaves.'" Id. at 1100.
210. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which
protected newspaper publishers forn being required to print the replies of those criticized
by them, with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which found no
such protection for broadcasters, who must provide free time for criticism victims.
211.
15 U.S.C. §57(d)(1) (Supp. V. 1975) requires the FTC to make a statement of the
economic effect of any rule to be promulgated.
212. See In re Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C. 2d at 369. See also, Children's
Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C. 2d at 9 (stating that broadcasting cannot exist without advertising).
213. See, eg., Broadcasting Magazine, June 10, 1974, at 18.
214. Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971).
215. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974),
aff'd sub nom., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See also Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Agriculture and Environmental and
Consumer Protection Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 755 (1974). The FCC and FTC
have adopted a Liason Agreement recognizing the FTC's responsibility to regulate unfair
and deceptive advertising while the FCC will consider such FTC findings in its licensing
decisions. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) f9852 (1972).
216. 50 F.C.C. 2d at 12. See also Children's Television Programs Report and Policy
Statement, 39 Fed. Reg. 39396, 39400-01 (1974). The NAB adopted the following time
restrictions: beginning Jan. 1975, the Code will permit 10 minutes of non-program material
on Saturday and Sunday children's programs and 14 minutes during the week. Prior to
Jan. 1976, this was reduced further to 9 1/2 and 12 minutes respectively. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F. 2d 458, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
217. 50 F.C.C.2d at 12. For example, in 1972 the NAB reduced the permissible amount
of non-program material on weekend children's television by four minutes per hour and
suffered only a 3% decrease in net revenues. rd. In an assessment of the impact of the
1972-1975 reductions in ad time on children's programs, Dr. Alan Pearce of the U.S. House
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of ad time was desirable and feasible but that a total ban was out of touch
with economic reality. One report discounts this view, 21s theorizing that children's television could be removed from the commercial market through a
gradual withdrawal of ad time. The report suggests that the market adjustment ability of networks in conjunction with alternative public and private
support could function to phase out advertising on children's television in
three to eight years. 219 Although the report noted that economic burdens
would also affect more than just the broadcast networks and stations, it indicated that the public interest in removing children's television from its present
state of commercialization takes precedence over a broadcaster's economic
2 20
interests.
The FCC requires broadcasters to present public interest programming to
maintain their licenses. It has specific statutory authority to refuse licenses
to stations not operating in the "public interest, convenience and necessity."221
In a 1960 statement of basic programming policy, the FCC listed children's
programming as one of fourteen major elements usually necessary to meet
the public interest, needs and desires of the community. 222 In the 1970 ACT
petition, the FCC reiterated the broadcaster's duty to provide diversified programming in the best interests of the child audiences. 223 Of greater importance
was the FCC's recognition that it had the statutory power to prohibit advertising and adopt rules requiring stations to continue children's programming. 224 Clearly the FCC could force networks to carry children's programs

Subcomm. on Communications concluded that the three major networks lost nothing
in gross revenues. He also indicated further reductions may have no impact on network
revenues. Children's Ad Cuts Pose No Threat to Network Profits, AMrION FOR CHILDREN'S
TELEvisION NEws, Winter 1977, at 1.
218. W. MELODY, supra note 55.
219. Id. at 434. In his plan for conversion to alternative financing, Melody would
begin with substituting one hour of existing commercial children's programming for
one hour of non-commercial programming. As more funds become available, more substitution could occur. His listed alternative sources of financing include: (1) institutional
advertisers (currently, Health Tex leads in this category); (2) underwriting; and (3)government (chiefly H.E.W., which spends substantial amounts on children's educational films).
Id. at 435. J. HowARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at 88, suggested that each network
set aside one hour of non-commercial programming on a staggered timing basis, thus
giving the child a three-hour viewing block without colmmercial interruption.
220. W. MELODY, supra note 55, at 429.
221. 47 U.S.C. §§807(a), (d), 809(a), 312, 316 (1970). See National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. '190, 215-17 (1943). See also notes 209-210 supra and accompanying text.
222. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En.Banc Programming Inquiry,
20 P&-F RADIo REG. 1901, 1913 (1960).
228. 50 F.C.C.2d at 5. The FCC may also challenge the overcommercialization practices
of their licensees. Amendment of Part Three of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
with Respect to Advertising on Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 36 F.C.C.
45, 46 (1964); WMOZ, 86 F.C.C. 201, 241 (1964). But see Accomack-Northampton Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.2d 357 (1967), in which the FCC renewed the license of a station
which had aired up to 33 minutes of commercials per hour.
224. 50 F.C.C.2d at 19. This analysis was affirmed on appeal. 564 F.2d 458 at 480.
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even without advertising revenue, 225 although the consequences of such a
compulsion are controvertible.
Industry spokesmen further contend that the proposed regulations would
probably destroy the small or economically marginal licensee,226 and thus
conflict with the public's interest in maintaining financially sound licensees. 22 7
Although this possibility exists, one court has held that an FCC rule may be
2 28
validly enacted even though it economically burdens the small licensee.
In the field of children's television, several examples of non-commercial
programming endeavors currently exist. One such endeavor is by Children's
Television Workshop, producer of Sesame Street and The Electric Company.2 2 9 Another is the Public Broadcasting Service

(PBS), established by

Congress in 1967 for non-commercial programming.23 0 Additionally, the Communications Act was amended to authorize non-commercial station allocation
by the FCC, 231 and the formation of a Children's Television Network to
provide shows for individual licensees has been recommended..232
Thus there are several factors which indicate that a legal and economic
foundation could be laid for the elimination of children's advertising should
the FTC find it unfair or deceptive.23 3 These factors include the FCC's deference to the FTC in the regulation of unfair and deceptive advertising; the
FCC's assurance of maintaining broadcasting in the public interest, especially the children's interest; the likelihood of workable alternative financing
for non-commercial programs; and the existence of current non-commercial
programming endeavors.
CONCLUSION
Hearings on the present staff proposal will begin in early November of
1978, but the staff recommendations as to the form of the final rule will probably not be released until July of

1979.

2 4
3

The Commission will then decide

whether or not to issue a children's advertising rule. Although all four Commissioners have agreed there exists sufficient evidence of potential unfairness
in children's advertising to support stricter regulation, three have balked at
the staff's ban on advertising to younger children.2 35 This division among
225.

See generally Note, The FCC as Fairy Godmother: Improving Children's Tele-

vision, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1290 (1974).
226. 50 F.C.C.2d at 28.
227. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1958).
228. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F,2d 470, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
229. See Note, supra note 225, at 1307.
230. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, amending 47
U.S.C. §§390-399 (1964).
231. 47 U.S.C. §396(1976).
232. See Note, supra note 225, at 1335.
233. It is important to note initially that the Supreme Court has ruled that the denial
of a license for failure to operate in the public interest is not an abridgement of free
speech, thus apparently granting the FCC authority to require quality children's programming even in absence of advertising revenue and with the risk of loss of license. See
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
234. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 331, May 1, 1978 at 10.
235. Advertising Age, March 6, 1978, at 1, col. 3. Chairman Pertschuk is the only
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the Commissioners has renewed the optimism of concerned industrial groups
23 6
which have combined to form a united front against the staff proposal.
The FTC staff's proposed action may thus offer only temporary appeasement
of hostile consumer groups and ultimately fail of its essential purpose due
23 7
to internal disagreement and external pressure.
Yet current psychological and physiological studies confirm that strict
regulation of children's advertising is in the best interest of the public in
general and children in particular. 238 In spite of the long history of special
protection afforded children, a child today is treated as an adult when viewing television. The proposed restrictions, however, are not based on popular
sentiment alone. The Commission has consistently affirmed the credulity of
children in finding advertising addressed to them deceptive. The proposal
would merely allow the Commission to proceed against all deceptive advertising at once rather than proceeding piecemeal against only the most blatant
offenders. Due to the deception provision's alleged potential for ultimate
inclusion of all advertising, perhaps the sounder basis for regulation is through
the finding of unfairness. Case law from Keppel through Hudson has provided an adequate legal foundation for the application of the unfairness
doctrine. Since for many children television is the sole source of nutritional
information, the unfairness of advertising highly sugared foods to children
can easily be sustained by application of the judicially approved three-factor
Cigarette Rule:2 3 9 (1) such advertising offends public policy, which favors
protection of children from unknown risks; (2) it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous as the high pressure, well-financed and psychocommissioner presently in favor of the ban. Commissioner Dixon stated he was "flat out
against" an outright ban. Commissioner Dole felt there was insufficient evidence to justify
any bans. And Commissioner Clanton suggested that an attempt to improve advertising
should be considered first. Id. at 76, cols. 2-3. Moreover, because of this division, Chairman
Pertschuk agreed to list more moderate alternatives alongside the staff's proposal to be
discussed during the hearings. TRADE RFG. REP. (CCH) No. 3111, May 1, 1978 at 10.
236. A previous showing of division among industry groups came about when cereal
manufacturers sought to distinguish their products from the "sticky sweet" candy manufacturers' product. See Advertising Age, Nov. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 3. However, the staff's
proposal and Commission's divisiveness have engendered a united industry front, evidenced
by a recent meeting including: the American Association of Advertising Agencies, American
Advertising Federation, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Toy Manufacturers of America,
and Chocolate Manufacturers of America. Advertising Age, March 13, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
The industry lobbyists, in conjunction with those members of Congress who wish to

weaken the FTC's rulemaking power, are currently seeking to prohibit Commission regulation of children's advertising, through riders attached to the current FTC appropriations
bill. Advertising Age, May 29, 1978, at 2, col. 3; Advertising Age, June 12, 1978, at 2, col. 4.
237. Children may still benefit even if the staff proposal is not accepted, due to the
extreme pressure placed on the NAB at this time. The NAB has already indicated that
Code time standards for children's programs may be revised. Advertising Age, April 17,
1078, at 1, col. 2.
238. Many other countries have recognized the children's interest involved and have
acted to protect them. The United States is one of the minority of free world nations
allowing advertising on children's programs. J. HowARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 17, at
66. See also Powell, Protection of Children in Broadcast Advertising; The Regulatory
Guidelines of Nine Nations, 26 FED. CoiIM. B.J. 61 (1973).
239. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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logically sophisticated advertiser is pitted against the credulous and unwitting
child; and (3) it causes substantial injury to children, both physically, as
evidenced by dental decay, and psychologically, as evidenced by child/parent
alienation and early cynicism.
The constitutional barriers to the proposal have fallen. Adoption of the
proposed rule will continue to allow children's advertising, but channel that
advertising into a viewing time when a parent is available to serve as a
stabilizing influence. Children have long been singled out for special protection. The proposed rule is merely a recognition of such protection in the
electronic age.
ROBERT WATTWOOD
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